We analyze trading strategies involving triple-leveraged and inverse triple-leveraged ETF pairs by simulating daily returns over a 48 year period. Our results show that many such strategies significantly outperform the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis. The Sharpe ratio appears to be maximized when shorting the bear triple-leveraged ETF and the bull triple-leveraged ETF in a 2:1 proportion, and simultaneously holding Treasuries long. In this case we find that the average annual Sharpe ratio is more than four times higher than for the S&P 500, and that the strategy outperforms the market in 43 of the 48 years.
I. Introduction
Leveraged and inverse leveraged exchange traded funds (ETFs) have seen tremendous growth in popularity among investors since their introduction to financial markets in 2006. These instruments attempt to deliver specific multiples of the return on an underlying index, such as the S&P 500, on (usually) a daily basis. For example, the triple-leveraged ETF ProShares UltraPro S&P 500 (UPRO) seeks daily investment results corresponding to triple the daily performance of the S&P 500, while the inverse triple-leveraged ETF ProShares UltraPro Short S&P 500 (SPXU) seeks daily investment results corresponding to triple the inverse (i.e., negative) of the daily performance of the S&P 500. To accomplish these investment objectives, leveraged and inverse leveraged ETFs enter into futures and/or swap contracts tied to the underlying index.
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It is well established that, although leveraged and inverse leveraged exchange traded funds (henceforth, collectively, LEFTs) come close to achieving their target performance on a daily basis, long-run LETF returns generally do not equal the target leverage times the index returns (see, for example, Avellaneda and Zhang (2009) , Cheng and Madhavan (2009) , Lauricella (2009 ), Jarrow (2010 , Charupat and Miu (2011), and Tang and Xu (2012) ) because of the so-called constant leverage trap. In particular, both leveraged ETFs and inverse leveraged ETFs linked to the same underlying index often underperform the index, and by a large margin, over periods measured in months or years. Consider, for example, the performance of UPRO and SPXU during the one-week period 4/1/10 -4/7/10 and the eighteen-month period 4/1/10 -10/1/11. Figure 1 shows that in the short run UPRO achieved a return approximately equal to 3×
In order to keep the target leverage constant, the funds adjust their exposure to the index by rebalancing their futures and/or swap holdings on a daily basis.
that of the S&P 500, while SPXU attained a return close to -3× that of the S&P 500. However, in the long run both funds underperformed the index by more than 15%. Cheng and Madhavan (2009) illustrate similar underperformance for ProShares UltraShort Oil & Gas (DUG) and ProShares Ultra Oil & Gas (DIG), which are tied to the Dow Jones U.S. Oil & Gas Index with target leverage of -2× and 2×, respectively.
Our goal is to shed light on whether trading strategies involving LETF pairs have the potential to outperform the S&P 500. In particular, if the poor performance of UPRO and SPXU over long periods of time discussed above is typical, it may be possible to short both funds and generate profits higher than those offered by the index. It should be noted that the shorting strategy is not without risk. At times, one of the paired LETFs may significantly outperform the index (when held long) over an extended time period, resulting in poor pairs trade performance.
For example, Figure 2 shows that during 11/21/2011 -4/2/2012, a 50%-50% allocation to UPRO and SPXU would have produced a positive return, and therefore a shorting strategy with the same weights would have produced a negative return. On the other hand, the S&P enjoyed a return of about 18% -much better than the shorting strategy. Ultimately, whether a shorting strategy can be relied upon to consistently outperform the S&P is an empirical question. Since LETFs are relatively new products with short track records, we attempt to answer this question by simulating LETF returns.
Our research would be of only theoretical significance if it were difficult or impossible to borrow shares of LETFs, since shorting requires a simultaneous borrowing and selling of the security in question. As it turns out, many, if not most, LETFs can be shorted in practice. In fact, one of the authors of this paper has been shorting LETFs in his modestly sized online brokerage account for some time. Occasionally, the brokerage firm requests that the short position be partially or fully closed out, but such requests are infrequent. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the size of the account does play a role in determining the likelihood of it being targeted by the brokerage when shares need to be returned to a lender.
We focus specifically on UPRO and SPXU because they are very liquid funds, with average holding periods of less than 2 days and less than 3 days, respectively, and average bidask spreads of only 0.04% and 0.03%, respectively, and because the underlying index is the broad U.S. stock market. Other triple-leveraged and inverse triple-leveraged ETFs are somewhat less liquid and/or track either a subset of the U.S. stock market or other financial or real asset markets. In addition, UPRO and SPXU shares can be, and have been, sold short.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section II we review prior literature. In Section III, we describe our simulation design. In Section IV, we present our main findings on the long-term performance of various shorted leveraged ETF pairs strategies. In Section V, we discuss the affect of dividends, tracking errors, transaction costs, fund fees and expenses, and taxes on the performance of these strategies. Finally, we summarize our research and offer concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. Literature review
Leveraged ETFs are a recent financial innovation, and the research in this area is still in its infancy. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine shorting strategies using LETFs.
Other studies of LETFs have focused on modeling the return dynamics, examining the sources and characteristics of tracking errors, investigating the effect of LETF trading on underlying security trading, and discussing the suitability of LETFs for retail investors.
Wang (2009), Avellaneda and Zhang (2009), and Cheng and Madhavan (2009) is less than 1, and therefore the LETF return is less than the compounded index return.
Hence, assuming index returns follow a geometric Browning motion, the LETF will lose money unless index performance is sufficiently strong.
Charupat and Miu (2011) examine a group of Canadian LETFs, and report that they have extremely small daily tracking errors. However, they define tracking errors in terms of net asset values (NAV) rather than LETF prices. Whether daily LETF returns are close to their targets remains unanswered. Tang and Xu (2012) find that daily tracking errors for a set of LETFs linked to the S&P 500, Dow Jones, and NASDAQ-100, are substantial. LETF managers consistently underleverage, and the effect on fund performance accumulates over time. The main cause of this underexposure appears to be the cost of adjusting exposure on a daily basis. Shum and Kang (2012) report that daily tracking errors for a set of LETFs linked to the Toronto Stock Exchange, gold, oil & gas, MSCI EAFE, and the S&P 500 are sizeable as well. Once again, underexposure to the underlying index appears to be the main source of deviation from target returns. Cheng and Madhavan (2009) investigate the effect of LETFs on market volatility. They show that the required daily re-leveraging around the market close imparts additional systemic risk to the market. This phenomenon is expected to become more pronounced as aggregate LETF assets under management continue to increase. The debate as to whether LETFs are partly responsible for the recent increase in market volatility has been picked up by the media (Sorkin (2011 ), Kephart (2012 ). Haryanto, et al. (2012) find that although LETF rebalancing demands do lead to higher market volatility, this effect is economically significant only when the market experiences a large positive or negative return by 3:30 PM. Bai, et al. (2012) examine whether two real estate-linked and four financials-linked LETFs influence the late-day volatility of 63 real estate sector stocks, and report greatest impacts for smaller, less actively traded, and more volatile stocks.
The growing sentiment that LETF return dynamics over periods longer than one day are not well understood by the average retail investor has led many financial advisors to dissuade their clients from investing in these funds. Additionally, in 2012 FINRA fined Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and UBS a total of $9.1 million "for selling leveraged and inverse exchange-traded funds (ETFs) without reasonable supervision and for not having a reasonable basis for recommending the securities". Dulaney, et al. (2012) find that average holding periods for five LETFs they study range from 5.3 days for Direxion Developed Markets Bear 3X to 22.7 day for ProShares Ultra Russell 1000 Value Fund. Furthermore, a substantial number of investors hold these LETFs for periods longer than one quarter, suggesting they don't fully understand the long-term drag on returns caused by daily re-leveraging. The authors conclude that LETFs are unsuitable for the average retail investor.
III. Simulation design
UPRO and SPXU, the ETFs mentioned above, began trading on the NYSE on June 23, 2009. As of this writing, there is insufficient empirical data to conclusively determine whether a strategy involving positions in one or both of the funds that consistently outperforms the S&P 500 exists. Our solution is to simulate hypothetical fund returns during 1963-2010 and compare the simulated Sharpe ratios achieved by various trading strategies to the actual Sharpe ratios attained by the S&P 500 during the contemporaneous period. To ensure that our results and conclusions are accurate, we preserve a number of statistical properties related to the price dynamics of UPRO and SPXU in our simulation design. Although we work with price returns (that is, we ignore dividends), as we show in Section V our results are equally applicable to total returns. All price data we use in this study are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
To uncover the relevant statistical properties contained in the empirical data, we first run a pair of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of LETF returns on S&P 500 returns: , which is statistically different from the target leverage of -3 at the 1% level. We calibrate our simulation design to the empirical leverage rather than the target leverage. 3 We believe that results based on empirical leverage rather than on target leverage are most realistic, since other LETFs appear to miss their targets as well. For example, Lu, et al (2009) report that ProShares Ultra Dow 30 (DDM), ProShares UltraShort Dow 30 (DXD), ProShares Ultra S&P 500 (SSO), ProShares UltraShort S&P 500 (SDS), ProShares Ultra QQQ (QLD), and ProShares UltraShort QQQ (QID) are underleveraged relative to their targets by a statistically significant margin, while Shum and Kang (2012) document similar results for LETFs that are linked to the Toronto Stock Exchange, gold, oil & gas, MSCI EAFE, and S&P 500. where the parameters are from (2). We simulate the tracking errors, , there the w's indicate the relative default weights of the two ETFs in the portfolio. The rebalance thresholds vary from no rebalancing to rebalancing only when the relative weights diverge from the default ratio by a substantial margin.
In addition to shorting UPRO and/or SPXU, every strategy involves a long position in the 3-month Treasury bill. The default total short position in the combination of UPRO and/or SPXU is equal to the long position in the Treasury bill. At the end of each trading day, the long balance is compared to the short balance. If the long balance is greater than 90% but less than 110% of the short balance, no inflow or outflow into the short subaccount takes place (although rebalancing between UPRO and SPXU may still be necessary). If the long balance is less than 90% of the short balance, a "margin call" requires the investor to decrease her short balance by "buying to cover" UPRO and SPXU in equal proportions up until the short balance and the long balance equalize.
5 If the long balance is greater than 110% of the short balance, the strategy requires the investor to increase her short balance by shorting additional shares of UPRO and SPXU in equal proportions up until the short balance and the long balance equalize. In short, every trading strategy we examine contains a short UPRO/SPXU position and a long T-bill position. Once the return sequence for a particular strategy is obtained, standard portfolio analysis techniques can be used to assess the profitability of the strategy relative to the market.
IV. Simulation results
The main results of our simulations, including average annual returns, standard deviations, and Sharpe ratios are presented in Since the 33.3:66.7 strategy with +20%/-20% rebalancing performs better than any of the others as measured by the Sharpe ratio, we focus primarily on this strategy (which we refer to as Second, as the ratio of UPRO to SPXU increases, the annual return decreases, as does the geometric annual return. Third, as the ratio of UPRO to SPXU increases, the standard deviation decreases until we reach the 50:50 portfolio, after which it begins to increase. Fourth, rebalancing is key for all portfolios other than the 0:100 portfolio. Without rebalancing, the SPXU balance drops to near $0 over time, while the UPRO balance grows without limit. As a result, given a long enough investment horizon, the strategy loses money. In the case of 0:100, there is no investment in UPRO, and therefore the lack rebalancing is not a concern. Fifth, inflows and outflows are most frequent for strategies that don't entail rebalancing. Sixth, and not surprising, tighter rebalancing thresholds lead to more frequent rebalancing. In practice, trading triggered by inflows, outflows, and rebalancing has the potential to wipe out any profits because of transaction costs imposed on the investor. We discuss transaction costs in more detail in Section V.
6 Strategy A can have a lower average Sharpe ratio than strategy B despite a higher average return and a lower average standard deviation because the average Sharpe ratio is not the average difference between returns on the portfolio and the risk-free rate divided by the average portfolio standard deviation, but rather the average of the individual Sharpe ratios.
the base case) throughout the remainder of our paper. In Table 2 we present evidence that the base case portfolio doesn't merely outperform the S&P 500 over very long investment horizons, but also consistently outperforms the market during 1-year holding periods. The To assess potential losses from the base case strategy, we examine the top ten drawdown events over 1-day, 1-week, 1-month, and unbounded non-overlapping periods. The results are tabulated in Tables 1 and 2 , while keeping drawdowns (and volatility) to the desired level.
V. Discussion
Dividends, tracking errors, transaction costs, fund fees and expenses, and taxes have important implications for the performance of the trading strategies we consider. We now discuss each of these in turn.
A. Dividends
Although we have been focusing on price returns, our results hold for total returns as well. In particular, any shorting strategy that yields better risk-adjusted performance than the S&P 500 in terms of price returns also produces better risk-adjusted performance than the market in terms of total returns. More formally, assuming no tracking errors, 
where p r is the annual return on the portfolio, f r is the annual risk-free rate, p σ is the annualized standard deviation of the portfolio, m r is the annual return on the market, m σ is the annualized standard deviation of the market, and p D and m D are the dividend yields on the portfolio and the market, respectively. Statement (5) follows because all dividends distributed by the component stocks are paid in multiple to the bull LETF by its counterparty, and have to be paid in multiple by the bear LETF to its counterparty, and the fact that, 
, where λ is the total exposure of the portfolio to the market, and the inequality is by assumption.
If a trading strategy is subject to tracking errors, as in our case, then (5) Second, underleveraging (as well as overleveraging, which is not common) impacts tracking errors, since the resulting fund returns are different from target returns. However, underexposure decreases interest transfers discussed above, so it may bring actual returns closer in line with target returns.
Third, residuals…, while the negative autocorrelation of residuals… Fourth, fund fees and expenses may exacerbate tracking errors because they may create a drag on LETF returns. Fees and expenses are discussed in more detail below.
C. Transaction costs
We can approximate transaction costs by using the data on trading frequencies, rebalance thresholds, inflow/outflow thresholds, and bid-ask spreads. In particular, not counting commissions and assuming rebalancing and inflows/outflows don't occur on the same days, average annual trading costs as a percentage of portfolio value can be expressed as, .058%
(10%)
This is very low, and should not have a significant impact on the performance of the portfolio.
D. Fund fees and expenses
Unless the present value of expected future LETF fees and expenses is already reflected in market prices, these operating costs create a drag on LETF returns. Consequently, fees and expenses boost the performance of shorting strategies. For the funds we examine in this paper, market values are very close to NAVs, so these costs do not appear to be impounded in prices.
All else equal, the higher the fees and expenses, the better the shorting strategy ought to perform.
As of December 2012, UPRO's and SPXU's annual expense ratios are 0.95% and 0.93%, respectively, which ranks the two LETFs at the low end in terms of operating costs among all triple-leveraged and inverse triple-leveraged ETFs.
E. Taxes
Since short balances are marked to market, most tax obligations arising from favorable performance of our investment strategies can be postponed indefinitely. Assuming positive exposure to the market in the short subaccount (that is, a ratio of UPRO to SPXU of less than 1), inflows imply unrealized gains in the short subaccount and unrealized gains in the long subaccount, while outflows imply realized losses in the short subaccount and unrealized losses in the long subaccount. Neither situation requires immediate payment of taxes. Rebalancing usually leads to either unrealized gains for SPXU and realized losses for UPRO (when the market has been going up), or realized losses for SPXU and unrealized gains for UPRO (when the market has been going down), in which cases any tax obligations can also be postponed. Occasionally, rebalancing leads to unrealized gains for one of the LETFs and realized gains for the other (when the market has been going "sideways"), in which case taxes cannot be postponed. In sum, the tax implications of our shorting strategies are predominantly favorable.
VI. Conclusion
Leveraged and inverse leveraged exchange traded funds have become very popular financial products among investors since their introduction in 2006. These instruments allow investors to amplify directional bets on an underlying index. However, over extended periods, LETFs usually produce returns below that of the index times the leverage multiple. In fact, both bull and bear funds linked to an index often underperform the index over the same period. With this empirical observation in mind, we examine whether taking simultaneous short positions in triple-leveraged and inverse triple-leveraged ETFs can yield a higher Sharpe ratio than that of the S&P 500.
Since LETFs are a relatively new financial innovation, we simulate daily returns on a triple leveraged and an inverse triple leveraged fund over a period of 48 years. Our simulation design allows us to preserve a number of statistical properties of returns on a pair of actual funds, and calibrate them to the market returns during the period we investigate. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to explicitly estimate how these funds would have performed over the years. We find that many of the strategies we examine produce superior portfolio performance as measured by the Sharpe ratio. The optimal strategy appears to be one that shorts the bear LETF and the bull LETF in a 2:1 proportion, yielding an average Sharpe ratio that is more than four times higher than that of the S&P 500. This strategy also appears to be highly consistent in outperforming the market on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Performance of UPRO/SPXU/T-bill trading strategies
This table presents (arithmetic) average annual returns, geometric average annual returns, average annual standard deviations, and average annual Sharpe ratios for various UPRO/SPXU/T-bill trading strategies. The first column shows the default ratio of UPRO to SPXU in the short subaccount. The second column shows the rebalance thresholds for UPRO and SPXU. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth columns present each strategy's average return, geometric return, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio, respectively, as well as tstatistics from tests of each strategy's simulated results versus the S&P 500. The final three columns detail the average annual number of rebalances between UPRO and SPXU, inflows into the short subaccount, and outflows from the short subaccount, respectively. For comparison purposes, annual S&P 500 data are presented at the bottom of the table. All returns are price returns. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. All tests are two-tailed. 
